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Soldiers and Sailors

Civil Relief A ct,
Ifs Provisions and Effect
By L. A. HELLERSTEIN*
The Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act was enacted during the
World War. (March 8, 1918, Chap. 20, 40 Stat. 440) in order to protect the rights of citizens in military service. An early article commenting upon this act stated that it was intended to "free persons in military
service of the United States from harassment and injury to their civil
rights during the term of service and to enable them to devote their entire
energy to the military needs of the nation. It covers such subjects as
staying court proceedings, non-eviction for failure to pay rent, prohibiting foreclosure of mortgages, prohibiting the lapsing of insurance policies, etc. On the whole, the method of the act consists mainly in suspending proceedings and transactions during the soldier's or sailor's
absence so. that he may have an opportunity when he returns to be heard
and take measures to protect his interest.' -f
Section 4 of the Joint Resolution of Congress under the National
Guard Act (approved August 27, 1940) granted to persons called to
active service in the National Guard, United States Army Reserves and
Retired Personnel the benefits of certain provisions of the act.
Section 13 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (approved September 16, 1940) granted certain benefits of the Relief Act
to persons selected for such training and service.
Except as to certain portions of the act declared inoperative, the
Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act of 1918 is now in force and effect and
supplements our statutes and rules of procedure.
It should be noted that some of the benefits of the original Relief
Act are not granted to persons under either of the foregoing acts. Particularly, provisions of the act relating to protection against lapsing of
insurance policies and against tax sales upon land have been omitted.
It should also be noted that the act does not release or discharge any
person from his contractual or legal obligations. Its aim is principally
to suspend actions and thereby protect one in military service. The act
grants discretion to the court, in many instances, as to the extent relief
shall be granted under the act or what terms or conditions should be
imposed.
*Of the Denver Bar.
tNote: Articles in Illinois Law Review, February, 1918, Vol.- 12, No. 7, by
John H. Wigmore. Mansfield Ferry and Samuel Rosenbaum.
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The benefits of the act accrue, not when a person is inducted in
active service but from the date he is ordered to active duty. The period
of military service ends 60 days after the termination of active service.
Criminal penalties are provided for in event of violation of some provisions.
ANALYSIS OF THE ACT

General Provisions (Sec. 103) : The act is intended to apply not
only to persons in military service, but its benefit may also be granted to
sureties, guarantors, endorsers and others subject to the obligation or the
liability. The court is given wide discretion in these matters and generally may or may not grant relief, dependent upon the particular facts

involved.
Defaults (Sec. 200) : Plaintiffs are required in default cases, before entering judgment, to file an affidavit setting forth facts that the
defendant is not in military service. If the plaintiff is unable to determine whether the defendant is in such service, and an affidavit is filed
so showing, an order of court is required to have judgment entered. If
a defendant is in military service, no judgment may be entered until the
court shall have appointed an attorney to represent the defendant and
protect his interest. The court may also require the filing of a bond to
protect a defendant, if in military service, against loss or damage that he
may suffer should the judgment be thereafter set aside in whole or in part.
The court may also make such other and further orders or enter such
judgment as may in its opinion be necessary to protect the rights of the
defendant in the service.
Appointment of Attorney (Sec. 200 (3)): The act provides that
in any action or proceeding to which a person in military service is a
party and if such party does not personally appear or is not represented
by an authorized attorney, the court may appoint an attorney to represent him. The court may also require a bond. An attorney appointed
has no power to waive any rights of the person for whom he is appointed
or bind him by his acts.
Vacating Judgment (Sec. 200 (4)): The act provides that if a
judgment is rendered against the person in military service during the
period of such service, or within 30 days thereafter, and such person was
prejudiced by reason of his military service in making his defense, such
judgment may, upon application within 90 days after the termination
of military service, be reopened and the defendant permitted to defend,
provided he has a meritorious or legal defense to the action or some part
of it.
Stay of Action (Sec. 201) : At any stage in an action or proceed-

ing a court may in its discretion stay an action or proceeding against the
person in military service during the period of his service, or within 60
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days thereafter, unless in the opinion of the court the ability to prosecute
or defend the action is not materially affected by reason of his military
service.
Penalties (Sec. 202) : A court may relieve a fine or penalty incurred under the terms of a contract for non-performance where the
ability of the person to pay or perform was materially impaired by reason
of his military service.
Attachments and Garnishments (Sec. 203): The court may, in
its discretion, stay executions or orders, vacate or stay any garnishment
or attachment before or after judgment in an action against a person in
military service before or during the period of such service or within 60
days thereafter.
Length of Stay (Sec. 204) : Stays ordered by the court generally,
and except as otherwise provided, may be for the period of military service and three months thereafter, and subject to such terms as may be just.
That is, the court may fix installment payments or terms to be complied
with upon granting the stay. The court may also grant leave to proceed
against co-defendants who are not parties to the action.
Statute of Limitations (Sec. 205) : The period of military service
is excluded in computation of such statutes.
Rent (Sec. 300 (1)) : No eviction can be made during the period
of military service in respect to any premises occupied chiefly for dwelling
purpose by the wife, children or other dependents of such person, where
the rent does not exceed $50.00 per month, except upon leave of court
granted therefor, or such an order granted in an action. The court may,
in its discretion, stay the proceeding for not longer than three months or
make such other orders as may be just, provided that the payment of
rent is materially affected by reason of such person being in the military
service.
The Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy may order an
allotment of the pay of a person in military service in a reasonable proportion to discharge rent.
Installment Contracts (Sec. 301 (1)) : The section covering this
subject is as follows:
"That no person who has received, or whose assignor has received. under a contract for the purchase of real or personal property, or of lease or bailment with a view to purchase of such property, a deposit or installment of the purchase price from a person or
from the assignor of a person who, after the date of payment of
such deposit or installment, has entered military service, shall exercise any right or option under such contract to rescind or terminate
the contract or resume possession of the property for nonpayment
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of any installment falling due during the period of such military

service, except by action in a court of competent jurisdiction."
The purport of the above section is to require a court proceeding to

terminate or rescind an installment contract or to resume possession of
the property sold. This section applies and extends to both the original
vendor or his assignee provided a deposit or installment has been paid.
Further, if the instrument used be a lease or bailment contract where the
goal is a purchase the act applies. Other conditions appear to be required
to bring the act in effect:
1)
A deposit or installment upon the purchase must have been

(2)
(3)

paid.
The person entered military service after the deposit or installment was paid.
The non-payment occurred concerning an installment falling
due during the period of military service.

It would appear from this section that if no deposit or installment
was paid prior to the person entering military service or if the non-payment of an installment occurred prior to the period of military service,
the provisions of this section are inapplicable. There seems to be no
reference in this section to acts of default other than non-payment of
installments.
A criminal penalty is provided for failure to observe the mandates
of this section. Upon a hearing of such action, the court may order the
repayment of prior installments or deposits, or any part thereof, as a
condition of terminating the contract and resuming possession of the
property, or it may stay proceedings if the defendant is unable to comply
with the terms of the contract due to his military service; or it may make
such other disposition of the case as may be equitable to conserve the
interests of all the parties.
The parties may agree to terminate or cancel the contract pursuant
to mutual agreement if such agreement is in writing and subsequent to
the making of the contract and during the period of military service.
(Added by the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940.)
Mortgages, Trust Deeds and Securities (Sec. 302 (2)) : The provisions of the Relief Act, Sec. 301 (1) ' relating to installment contracts
for purchase of real or personal property, do not apply to mortgages,
trust deeds or securities. A Texas court so held in the case of Bashman
v. Evans, 216 S. W. 446. This distinction is of importance, since no
language appears in the sections relating to mortgages, trust deeds and
securities to prevent repossession without a court action. A further distinction appears since the sections of the Relief Act relating to mortgages,
trust deeds and securities only apply to such instruments originating prior
to the dates of the approval of the National Guard Act and Selective
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Service and Training Act (August 27 and September 16, 1940, respectively), while as to installment contracts of purchase the date of origin
of the instruments is of no materiality, as long as a deposit or installment
was paid before the person entered military service.
There may be some inconsistency in the foregoing distinctions made
and the wisdom of Congress in differentiating between such types of
instruments.
Sec. 302 (1) of the Relief Act is as follows:
"That the provisions of this section shall apply only to obligations originating prior to the date of approval of this Act and
secured by mortgage, trust deed, or other security in the nature of a
mortgage upon real or personal property owned by a person in
military service at the commencement of the period of the military
service and still so owned by him."
Under the Relief Act then as to mortgages, trust deeds and securities,
before the Act may be applicable the said instruments (1) must have
originated prior to the effective date of the revival of the said act and
further, (2) the real or personal property must still be owned by a person
in military service at the commencement of the military service and (3)
still be so owned by him. Unless the foregoing conditions exist the sections of the act relating to mortgages, trust deeds and securities do not
apply.
In the event the foregoing conditions do exist, the act provides (Sec.
302 (2)) that if an action be commenced a court may stay such action
or make such other disposition of the case as may be equitable to conserve
the interests of all parties, unless the court is of the opinion that the ability of the defendant to comply is not affected by reason of his military
service.
A further important provision of the act relating to mortgages,
trust deeds and securities is as follows:
"Sec. 302 (3).
No sale under a power of sale or under a
judgment entered upon warrant of attorney to confess judgment
contained in any such obligation shall be valid if made during the
period of military service or within three months thereafter, unless
upon an order of sale previously granted by the court and a return
thereto made and approved by the court."
As has been stated as to mortgages, etc., the act is silent as to retaking or resuming possession of the property. It concerns itself primarily
with the method of foreclosure requiring a sale through an action and an
order of court. Chattel property may be repossessed without violating
the Relief Act, but such possession would be of little value unless the
court would permit a sale of the security. If, however, a replevin suit
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or a possessory suit is filed the court may stay the proceedings, in its discreton, as an ordinary action.
Transfers of Interest (Sec. 600) : In order to protect against evasion of the Relief Act, it provides that any interest or contract transferred
or acquired since the date of the approval of the act to avoid or delay its
provisions may nevertheless be subject to orders of court in any proceeding.
Decisions of Courts: Some of the early authorities have adjudicated portons of the act now in effect. For example, the effect of failure
to file an affidavit that a defendant is not in military service when default
and judgment are taken, was passed on in the cases of Howie Mining Co.
vs. McGary, 256 Fed. 38, and Harrell vs. Shealy, 100 S. E. 800, 24 Ga.
App. 389. The court held that a default judgment against a defendant
cannot be vacated for failure to file such affidavit unless the record shows
that the defendant was, as a matter of fact, in military service. To the
same effect is the case of Alzugaray vs. Onzurez, 187 Pac. 549, 25 N. M.
662, and the case of Wells vs. McArthur, 188 Pac. 322, 77 Okla. 279.
The holding of these cases seems to be that a defendant who is not in the
military service cannot take advantage of the failure of plaintiff to file
such affidavit.
Concerning the foreclosure of real estate mortgages, in the case of
Taylor vs. McGregor State Bank, 174 N. W. 893, 144 Minn. 249, the
court held that where a foreclosure and sale had been had by advertisement as authorized by the Minnesota statutes, which was fully completed
prior to the commencement of the mortgagor's military service, the redemption period which had not expired was not extended by the act by
such person being in such service.
In a decision of the United States Supreme Court, in the case of
Ebert vs. Poston, decided January 12, 1925, 45 Law Ed. 188, Mr.
Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the court and also held that the
period of redemption under foreclosures by advertisement was not extended for a period of military service under the Soldiers and Sailors
Relief Act. The court stated that a decree of foreclosure may be stayed
if the suit was commenced after the passage of the act and during the
period of military service. It is only sales made after the passage of the
act and during military service that are invalidated if made without leave
of court. The statutory right to redeem from a sale by advertisement is
not a right of action. It is a primary right as distinguished from a
remedy.
In the case of Lima Oil Co. vs. Pritchard, 92 Okla. 113, 218 Pac.
863, the court held that property may not be transferred to one in military service to delay parties to a contract or proceeding in enforcing their
rights.
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In the case of Riordan vs. Zeebe, 50 Calif., App. 22, 195 P. 65, the
court held that justice of the peace courts come within the act.
The act has been held to apply to equitable interests as well as legal
interests of a .person in military service, and even though unknown to one
foreclosing a real estate mortgage, the equitable interest was protected.
Hoffman vs. Bank, 121 N. E. 15. This ruling seems to be a harsh one.
In the case of Davison vs. Lynch, 171 N. Y. S. 46, the court held
that an attorney appointed to protect the interest of a person in military
service was not to be allowed any compensation and should regard such
service as a patriotic duty.
In the case of Kendall vs. Balster, 131 N. E. 319, 239 Mass. 152;
the court held that mortgages executed at a date subsequent to the approval of the act are not affected by it.
Other cases have been decided by the courts of various jurisdictions.
However, there are many propositions under the act that are still undetermined and require clarification. Probate and real estate actions are
examples of these. At the present time it appears likely the act will be
a factor to be considered and coped with for many years to come. The
act places the court in the position of being a chancellor in equity, a conciliator and the guardian and protector of persons in military service.
Every lawyer, to conscientiously serve his client, should give careful
attention to it, not only as to the language employed and its interpretation, but, in addition, such consideration should be given as to place
proper emphasis upon the patriotic motives which impelled its revival
and its broad purpose to conserve and preserve the rights of persons in
service of our country.

MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE
The following have been appointed to constitute the Membership
Committee of the Denver Bar Association:
Vernon V. Ketring, Chairman
Philip Hornbein, Jr.
Charles W. Sheldon, Jr.
Clarence '. Button
Frank J. Trelease, Jr.
William K. Ris
Charles H. Haines, Jr.
A. A. Brooks.
Fred B. Dudley

"ALMOST"
Trial Lawyer, almost invincible before a jury; has large corporate
practice; would undertake to assist in the trial of important litigation
anywhere in the United States; has refused steady employment as trial
lawyer offered him by one of the largest law firms in America. References. Address reply Box 5 21, care of West Publishing Co., St. Paul,
Minn.
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